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Abstract 
Inspired by the eminently successful physical theories 
and informed by commonplace experiences such as 
seeing a cat upon looking at a cat, conscious experience is 
thought of as a measurement or photocopy of given 
stimulus. Conscious experience, unlike a photocopy, is 
symbolic—like language—in that the relation between 
conscious experience and physical stimulus is analogous 
to that of the word "cat" and its meaning, i.e., arbitrary 
and yet systematic. We present arguments against the 
photocopy model and arguments for a symbolic 
conception of conscious experience. Learning and the 
corresponding plasticity of the brain make a strong case 
for the symbolic conception of conscious experience, 
while many extra-ordinary conscious experiences argue 
against the formalisation of consciousness as a measuring 
device. The notions of place-value notation and grammar, 
which organise quantitative measurements and conscious 
experiences in the medium of numbers and language, 
respectively, are suggested as model systems for putting 
together a comprehensive theory of conscious experience. 
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In physics we have quantum theory telling us all that ―we can say 
about nature‖ (Zeilinger, 2000). In biology we have the theory of 
evolution without which, in the words of Dobzhansky, ―nothing in 
biology makes sense‖ (Dobzhansky, 1973). In modern science, 
sadly, there is nothing that qualifies as a comprehensive theory of 
conscious experience, with consciousness remaining a mystery 
(Albright et al., 2000). This state-of-affairs is a result of 
neuroscientists subscribing to photometer metaphor or, more 
broadly, measurement-device conception of perception (Gilchrist, 
1994; Mausfeld, 2002). Cognitive neuroscientists, fascinated by the 
success of physics, readily adopt physical paradigms in thinking 
about conscious experience. A careful examination of the evolution 
of scientific models of facets of conscious experience such as 
memory, however, brings into sharp focus the possibility of a 
clearer understanding of conscious experience without necessarily 
having to imitate successful physical models. Early models of 
memory were physical in the sense that memory was modeled as a 
thing put in some place. Recollection, in this memory model, 
required specifying the location of the stored memory. 
Conventional computer memory is an implementation of this 
memory model: we have to specify the address of the memory 
store in order to retrieve the contents stored at that address. 
Abstracting from the everyday experience of using a part of 
memory (i.e. hint) to recollect the rest of memory, science found a 
better alternative of using content [itself] as address, leading to the 
development of content-addressable memories of neural networks 
(Hopfield, 1982). 
The lessons of the history, briefly noted above, raise the possibility 
that the measurement-device conception of conscious experience 
that dictates much of the current cognitive neuroscience research is 
more of a reflection of the old habit of thinking in physical 
terminology and less of a description of conscious experience. This 
photocopy model of conscious experience is reminiscent of the out 
moded theory of art as ―imitation of reality‖ (Sontag, 1966). 
According to measurement-device conception, conscious 
experience is a measurement, say 10, of a stimulus. But ‗10‘ in and 
of itself is not very telling in the sense that the symbol string 10 
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could mean, for example, ten (in base ten place-value notation) or 
two (in base two notation). Simply put, a reading of measurement 
is a [place-value] notation in addition to being a quantity. 
Conscious experience, to the extent it is telling, is also a notation 
that is not given in any stimulus or [its] measurement. Conscious 
experience, like the notion of notation, is arbitrary (an act of 
creation) and yet systematic (Kandel, Schwartz & Jessell, 2000, p. 
493). While the notion of measurement captures the systematic 
aspect, a symbolic conception of conscious experience is required to 
capture the notational (arbitrary and systematic) aspect of 
experience. Our faith, fostered in part by the [partial] congruence of 
physical and perceptual terminology (e.g. ‗round ball‘ is perceived 
as ‗round ball‘), in the doctrine asserting that perception is a 
photocopy (albeit a noisy, degraded, or low-resolution one) of the 
physical reality seems to prevent us from recognising the symbolic 
quintessence of conscious experience. 
In the present note, we motivate the needed paradigm shift (from 
photocopy to symbol) in our conceptualisation of conscious 
experience. We begin with descriptions of conscious experiences 
that do not fit neatly within the photocopy framework and present 
detailed arguments in favor of the symbolic conception of 
conscious experience. Our symbolic conception of conscious 
experience is comparable to the interface theory of perception 
(Hoffman, Singh & Prakash, 2015). The symbolic conception, in 
addition to the stimulus-percept semantics, is the needed syntax for 
putting together a comprehensive theory of conscious experience. 
I of It 
In Principles of Neural Science, in the famous Madeleine passage, 
which opens the study of perception, Marcel Proust identifies with 
his perceptual experience: ―this essence [the taste of Madeleine] 
was not merely inside me, it was me‖ (Kandel, Schwartz & Jessell, 
2000, p. 408). In the practice of neuroscience, however, there is no 
mistaking me for my perceptual experience; the distinction 
between perceiver and perceived defines perception. Proust‘s 
liberal interpretation of the constitution of I provides impetus for a 
searching examination of this seemingly self-evident axiom. 
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I identify with my body: that bony, skinny, bloody body, which is 
conceptualised as a container into which are collected all of my 
perceptual experiences, even though my perceptual experience of 
the body, as seen from the perspective of perception, is a percept 
just like innumerable other percepts such as the black cursor 
blinking in front of me, the air-conditioner humming above, and 
the keys felt under my fingertips. A part of my perception (body) is 
‗I‘, while the rest (tables, chairs, computers…) is relegated to the 
distant realm of ‗it‘. The conceptual shallowness of this convention 
can be gauged by visualising a ‗form of intuition‘, whose 
inhabitants identify themselves with their pinkies and treat the rest 
of their bodies as some kind of extraneous stuff that happens to be. 
This is not to deny the possibility of my body percept being unique 
in some respect amongst all of my perceptual experiences 
somewhat analogous to the way color percept, for instance, is 
distinguished from percepts of (say) shape and size by virtue of 
being not verifiable in modalities other than visual. In the absence 
of a distinguishing criterion, singling out my body to identify with 
myself, however, does sound scriptural. An illustration from 
middle-school mathematics may further clarify. Number one is 
distinct from rest of the numbers not because it would be nice to 
say number one is special, but by virtue of a property unique to 
number one (with respect to multiplication): 1 × n = n, where n is 
any number. Within the domain of perceptual discourse, the 
distance separating the perceptual experience of my body from the 
tastes I taste, the thoughts I think, the voices I hear, the faces I see, 
etc., appears to be in search of a metric. The fluidity of these 
notions—the perceiving I and the perceived it—is what Proust is 
inviting us to ponder when he prophetically pronounces that the 
taste of Madeleine is not in him, but that that is him. 
The identification of perceiver with perceived is not simply an 
argument [to be] made plausible by reason or rhetoric; it is 
perception—pure and proper—though not necessarily ordinary or 
commonplace. A clear description of one such percept can be found 
in the very first paragraph of Proust‘s magnum opus: ―I myself 
seemed actually to have become the subject of my book: a church, a 
quartet, the rivalry between François I and Charles V‖ (Proust, 
1922, p. 2). In addition to finding oneself in the other, the other is, at 
times, included in oneself via, as highlighted by Marx, ―a 
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prolongation of body‖ (Scarry, 1994, p. 85). Cultivating compassion 
is another instance of ‗I‘ expanding to encompass, in Darwin‘s 
words, ―all sentient beings‖ (Ekman, 2010). Though modern 
students of consciousness, abstracting from ordinary experience, 
treat the subject who perceives and the object that is perceived as 
given, and explain perceptual experiences in terms of the structure 
and properties of the perceiving subject and those of the perceived 
object, conscious experiences wherein the very percept is the 
identity of perceiving subject with perceived object clearly indicate 
that the subject-object divide that is hitherto treated as given is also 
a perceptual construct, and as such is in need of explanation as 
much as the percept of, say, color black. The following analogy 
illustrates the point. Chemists, in studying reaction rates, treat 
elements as given, but that did not prevent Fred Hoyle, for one, 
from theorising about the origin of those very elements. Put 
differently, seeking the experiential resolution of conscious 
experience into being and experience of the being, by the being, 
and for the being is in the character of science. 
In addition to the standard fare of shape, motion, and color 
perception that looks as though it is explained by the reality of 
punctate photons impinging on photoreceptors (Henry, 2005), there 
is, as alluded to already, a whole enchilada of experiences, the 
diversity of which is barely documented in neuroscience, but is 
intimately familiar to students participating in aesthetic and 
spiritual practices. The presence of experiences not exhibiting the 
usual Edgar Rubin faces of actor vs. audience, for example, of 
reducing oneself to a pure spectator mode of being (d‘Amboise, 
2006), is not immediately felt in the modus operandi of 
neuroscience. A not so esoteric feeling of ‗losing oneself‘ that some 
of us might have experienced while listening to music is one such 
experience from the ethereal expanse of experience beyond the 
Looking-Glass (of Lewis Carroll), which has been the subject of 
neuro-scientific investigations (Goldberg, Harel & Malach, 2006). 
We hope many more of these extra-ordinary experiences are 
brought within the curriculum of consciousness before they 
become extinct: experientially extinct! Not too long ago 
metaphysical poets, as T. S. Eliot noted, felt their thoughts. With 
consciousness whittled down to a photocopier, ‗feeling thought‘ is 
foreign—so foreign that we cannot comprehend what it means to 
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have ―a direct sensuous apprehension of thought, or a recreation of 
thought into feeling‖ (Eliot, 1975, p. 63). And, with feelings reduced 
to muscular reflexes, hardly anyone can experience the ecstasy of 
‗disappearing into the appearance‘ of one‘s love that was so 
palpable for Rumi and his ilk (Graham, 1987). Not very much 
unlike an anthropologist struggling to understand a lifestyle 
different from her or his own, we have a responsibility to refrain 
from castigating these distant conscious experiences for being part 
of humanities and embrace them in a pensive mood for systematic 
study. Furthermore, recognising the debt that molecular biology 
(the revolution we are living) owes to our appreciation of the 
biological diversity is a stimulus strong enough to look at the entire 
range of conscious experiences unfiltered by our contemporary 
sensibilities wrought by factors extraneous to the scientific pursuit 
of consciousness. 
Beyond the jurisdiction of ‗being determines consciousness‘, 
besides the everyday experiences that appear to obey the causal 
stimulus→percept framework, there are experiences violating the 
laws of narrative realism—reified linearity of the narrative—of ―the 
run run of story‖ (Graham, 1990). In providing a comprehensive 
account of consciousness-redefined collectively by the varieties of 
experiences—the mainstream and the marginalised—we need to 
abstain from deploying many of the intuitions that we inherited. 
Borrowing a phrase from Gertrude Stein, to make our point, ―there 
is no there there,‖ but for conscious experience. Conscious 
experience, not unlike the creative poet that Shakespeare spoke of 
(in ‗A Midsummer Night‘s Dream‘), endows [the acutely felt] 
existence with ―a local habitation and a name‖, spelled as reality. 
There is no room for reality, except as a construct like color or 
confabulation, in the proper study of perception. Reality, as it 
figures in conscious experience, is a poetic artifact of prosaic 
articulation. Being students of perception, perceptive of illusions 
competing with reality for the status of real, aren‘t we primed 
sufficiently to subscribe to Proustian I? In spite of the existence 
with its imposing ‗is‘ and I with its august ‗am‘ insisting on being, 
we cannot be conservative believers in contemplating conscious 
experience; we need to be nastik: unbelieve in being. 
Venkata Rayudu Posina                                 Symbolic Conscious Experience 
7 
 
Symbolic Conscious Experience 
Perceptual experience is not a [mere] measure of the reality out-
there, which resonates with mathematician‘s view of mathematics. 
Notwithstanding the ―unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics‖ 
(Wigner, 1960), mathematicians do not treat numbers merely as a 
model of quantities—heights and weights—out there in the world. 
Had mathematicians done so, neither would they have conceived 
the notion of prime number (a notion inherent in representing 
numbers but not in represented heights or weights), nor would 
they have constructed the place-value notation, which is just that—
a notation—not an emergent property of any measured quantity. 
But for the poetic place-value notation, mankind would still be 
adding numbers with fingers and toes. In algebra we notice that a 
representation (un-spatial symbols) can be an effective instrument 
for manipulating the represented (spatial surfaces and solids) 
without necessarily having to mirror that which is represented. 
More explicitly, the pictorial resemblance between algebraic 
symbols and the signified geometric objects is completely irrelevant 
in the practice of algebra. In mathematics, as David Hilbert makes 
it abundantly clear, ―one must be able to say at all times — instead 
of points, lines, and planes — tables, chairs, and beer mugs‖. 
Analogous symbolic nature of the relation between perception and 
physical stimulus is indicated, to note a neuroscientific study, by 
the neurophysiological finding that arbitrary static shapes 
symbolising motion directions activate, upon learning the 
associated meanings, neurons coding motion perception (Schlack & 
Albright, 2007). The symbolic relation between perceptual 
experience and physical reality encourages the study of appearance 
[with reality bracketed], along the lines of algebra. Following in the 
footsteps of the mathematical practice of treating imaginary 
number as real as real number in calculations, thoughts are 
considered as ―real‖ as things and are ―equivalent‖ in the scientific 
(i.e. methodical) program of conceptualising conscious experience. 
After all, in conscious experience the two domains of discourse—
things and thoughts—are constantly translated into one another as 
we make things we think of and as we think about things that are. 
The [undefined] primordial conscious experience of early life 
differentiates, via a thousand cuts such as the spectator-spectacle 
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subdivision and the schism between spatial intuition and symbolic 
reason, into our everyday experience of cars speeding, people 
smiling, and walls standing still all within the confines of yet 
another construct called reality. The diversification of conscious 
experience is reminiscent of and possibly a [vast] generalisation of 
the more thoroughly studied figure-ground segmentation of visual 
images. When I see these black contours against white background, 
for example, I not only see the colors and the shapes, but also 
experience the subjectivity of seeing and the objectivity of the seen, 
to name a couple of species of experience. The study of conscious 
experience, however, has been, for methodological convenience, 
focusing on the changes in perception and associated neuronal 
activities as the learned neuroscientist varies physical stimuli. The 
causal questions to which this experimental paradigm readily lends 
itself are definitely important, but equally important are questions 
of fit: the question of how features like color and shape fit together 
or of how modalities like vision and touch relate to one another or 
of how perception, conception, emotion, intuition, desire, intention, 
action, etc. all cohere into that which we call conscious experience 
(Roskies, 1999). Unlike the fit between organism and environment, 
which guided the development of the theory of evolution, the 
notion of ‗fit‘ appropriate for the domain of consciousness 
discourse is that of ‗coherence‘ of languages—of combining 
signification-free alphabet into meaningful words, and of 
combining truth-value free words into truthful statements (cf. it 
makes no sense to ask: is ―cat‖ true?, but makes perfect sense to ask 
whether a statement: ‗cat is on the mat‘ is true). Development of a 
comprehensive theory of conscious experience can draw on the 
experience of designing languages (beginning with ―arbitrary‖ 
alphabet and building all the way to linear narratives and non-
linear verse via rules of composition) and of mathematical practices 
(founded in un-defined terms and well-defined rules of 
substituting symbols). Treating mathematics as a specialisation of 
ordinary language, the project of comprehending conscious 
experience can be concisely stated as a generalisation of symbolic 
language, analogous to the algebraic generalisation of arithmetic. 
The understanding of mathematical structures in terms of 
presentation-representation (Lawvere, 2004) in particular, and of 
languages in terms of syntax-semantics in general can be adopted 
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as a thinking device in the conceptualisation of conscious 
experience. 
Conscious experience, like the symbols constituting this text, 
readily lends itself to material interpretations. Comprehending 
conscious experience, just as is the case with symbolic language, 
calls for more than a mastery of the material things signified by 
conscious experience i.e., creation and codification of the syntax for 
conscious experience. Though we begin our education with 
associational semantics as in associating the sound ‗cat‘ with the 
thing ‗cat‘ out-there, we ―unlearn‖ the thing meaning of cat and 
learn that the [word] cat is not made up of [real] tail or whiskers 
but is made up of made-up alphabets. In comparing conscious 
experience to symbolic language, we see the need for the 
development of syntax for conscious experience in addition to 
compiling the dictionary of physical stimuli–conscious percepts 
associational semantics. Symbolic conception of conscious 
experience argues for according conscious experience, for the 
purposes of a coherent description of conscious experience, an 
existence in-and-of-itself separate from its material meanings 
analogous to the way we accord words (in language) an existence 
apart from their meaning. The symbolic conception of conscious 
experience, with symbol as both itself and that which it signifies, 
can be understood as a generalisation of measurement-device 
conception of conscious experience. Within the framework of 
symbolic conscious experience, without denying the fact that a 
physical stimulus elicits a perceptual experience, stimulus is a 
particular interpretation of conscious experience. This paradigm is 
modeled after theoretical physics, wherein, say, people enter 
theory, but only as physical notions such as heights and weights 
and not as they are with all their conflicting feelings and desires. 
Conclusion 
Perception, for the purpose of understanding conscious perceptual 
experience, is original. Acknowledging the primacy of perception is 
akin to treating line as elemental (with point treated as a line of 
zero length, as a derived entity, as opposed to treating point as the 
foundational element), with perceiver and perceived relegated to 
the status of endpoints of the line. More importantly, when we treat 
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consciousness as a measuring device mirroring reality, we are 
limiting our understanding of conscious experience. Be that as it 
may, pretending that there really is something behind the veil of 
experience that looks and is somewhat like what I see is a habit that 
is so internalised, not to mention the potentially fatal consequences 
of acting otherwise, that it is not easy to renounce the notion of 
underlying reality, leave alone embrace the concept of emptiness 
and see ―the groundlessness of things‖ (Priest, 2009). 
Accommodating the bewildering diversity of species of 
consciousness without invoking underlying reality and without 
discounting the ambient aboutness intrinsic to experience is, it 
must be admitted, daunting, if at all feasible. The project of 
perception-without-perceiver [perceived], as intimidating as it is, 
appears approachable in light of Darwin‘s theory of biology: 
design-without-designer! 
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